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On human dignity and State sovereignty: The Italian Constitutional Court’s 238/2014 judgment on 
State immunity for international crimes 
 
Paolo De Stefani 
University of Padova 
 
Révolte. Si l'homme échoue à concilier la justice et la liberté, alors il échoue à tout - 
Et c'est la religion qui a raison ? Non, s'il accepte l'approximation.  
(Albert Camus. Carnets II (1942-1951), Gallimard, Paris 1964, p. 153) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court has flatly contravened the decision of the 
ICJ on Jurisdictional Immunity of States (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) of 2012, ruling 
that the customary norm on State immunity from civil suits before a foreign court as ascertained in 
the ICJ decision never entered the domestic legal order, because it is incompatible with core 
principles of the Italian Constitution. In execution of the Constitutional Court ruling, in 2015, some 
Italian tribunals have condemned Germany to pay damages to former Italian military internees 
victim of international crimes during World War II, thus integrating an international wrongful act 
on the part of Italy. The 238/2014 judgment has been criticised from many angles. Much criticism 
was addressed to its alleged dualist approach that seemed to insulate Italy. The paper argues that 
the 2014 judgment of the Italian court is rather a reasoned response to the ICJ decision, grounded 
on principles common to the Italian and the international law, and a call for a consistent 
application of State obligations concerning the effective implementation of human rights. From this 
perspective it constitutes a valuable contribution towards a principled and open-minded debate 
over the structure and function of international law. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this contribution is to present the aftermath (at least in Italy) of the well-known and 
much-debated judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of February 3, 2012, on 
Jurisdictional Immunity of States – Germany v. Italy.1 Professor Perrakis participated as the Agent 
of the Greek government in the hearing of the case and took the floor on September 2011 in support 
of Italy. In 2014, the Italian Constitutional Court, instead of paying deference to the ICJ and so 
closing the Italian-German affair, chose to raise the stake and to challenge the Hague’s dictum. 2 
This paper argues that the Italian Constitutional Court’s decision, far from representing a 
manifestation of national particularism framed in the classic cleavage between “dualism” and 
“monism”, and a step backward in the interstate dialogue, should instead be seen as a fresh 
contribution towards a principled “constitutional” approach to international law. The starting point 
will a be a short reconstruction of the background that lead to the adoption of the 2012 ICJ decision 
in the Immunity of States case, and a summary of the most recent developments the ICJ 
jurisprudence have had in Italy. After an initial acquiescence to the ICJ ruling, and the termination 
of some civil proceedings against Germany initiated by victims of World War II atrocities (war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, serious violations of human rights) committed by the Third Reich 
                                                
1  I.C.J. Reports Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)<br /> (Judgment) 2012 3 
February 2012 p. 99 (International Court of Justice) . 
2  Gazzetta Ufficiale (serie spec.) Judgment No. 238 (Judgment) 29 ottobre 2014 45, I 22 October 2014 1 (Italian 
Constitutional Court) . The English translation referred to in this contribution can be retrieved online at 
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S238_2013_en.pdf (last accessed: 
January 30, 2016). 
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in Italy, the reaction of some judges led to the proposition of a case before the Constitutional Court. 
An Italian tribunal challenged the constitutionality of the rule on State immunity as expressed in the 
ICJ decision (para. 2). The Italian Constitutional Court awarded in 2014 an important judgment, 
stating that the rule on State immunity from the civil jurisdiction of other States has not produced 
any effect in the Italian legal system, because it breached inviolable rights of the Italian 
Constitution (para. 3). The decision was positively welcomed in Italy, and some courts in 2015 
ruled that Germany had to pay damages to former Italian military internees. It has also been 
severely criticised, and para. 4 illustrates the most contentious aspects. The following paragraphs 
try to demonstrate that the judgment of the Constitutional Court should not be interpreted as a 
manifestation of chauvinistic dualism, but rather as complementing – and of course challenging – 
the 2012 ICJ ruling, by exploring aspects of the topic that the ICJ had deliberately and with 
insufficient justification expunged from its analysis, and, therefore, contributing to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the overall subject. The Constitutional Court’s approach to the 
matter may disclose a certain disillusion on the part of the judiciary towards the capacity of the 
political branch of tackling effectively sensitive human rights issues, and the case of the Italian 
military internees of the Second World War is a painful and shameful evidence that also free and 
democratic European States for decades have failed to settle an obvious case of denied justice. 
 
2. The Ferrini legacy and the ICJ ruling. Compliance and rejection (2012-2014) 
 
The 2012 judgment of the ICJ stemmed from the Ferrini jurisprudence of the Italian Supreme 
Court3. In a series of judicial cases, upheld by the Court of Cassation, Italian tribunals affirmed the 
responsibility of the German State for civil damages owed to some World War II Italian deportees 
whose miseries were largely disregarded in the post-war reparation schemes negotiated by the two 
concerned States. Such jurisprudence was considered by Germany in breach of the international law 
norm on the immunity of States from the jurisdiction of courts in another State4. The ICJ ruled in 
favour of the applicant, Germany, finding that the Italian courts’ proceedings whereby Germany 
was sued for tort liability by Italian victims of Nazi-related crimes were in breach of a well-
established international custom. It does not seem necessary to summarise the contents of the ICJ 
case. Suffice here to recall the conclusions of the ICJ on the main points of the controversy as 
articulated in the judgment. The majority of the ICJ ruled that “customary international law 
continues to require that a State be accorded immunity in proceedings for torts allegedly committed 
on the territory of another State by its armed forces and other organs of State in the course of 
conducting an armed conflict” (para. 78); that “a State is not deprived of immunity by reason of the 
fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human rights law or the international law 
of armed conflict” (para. 91); and that “even on the assumption that the proceedings in the Italian 
courts involved violations of jus cogens rules, the applicability of the customary international law 
on State immunity was not affected.” (para. 97) Moreover, the judgment adds that “[t]he Court is 
not unaware that the immunity from jurisdiction of Germany in accordance with international law 
may preclude judicial redress for the Italian nationals concerned. It considers however that the 
claims arising from the treatment of the Italian military internees […] together with other claims of 
Italian nationals which have allegedly not been settled […] could be the subject of further 
negotiation involving the two States concerned, with a view to resolving the issue” (para. 104). All 
in all, according to the ICJ, “Immunity cannot […] be made dependent upon the outcome of a 
                                                
3  Ferrini c. Repubblica Federale di Germania<br /> (Judgment No. 5044) Rivista di diritto internazionale 11 marzo 
2004 539 (Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Un. Civ.) . 
4 On the Ferrini jurisprudence cf., among others:  Pasquale De Sena and Francesca De Vittor. 'State Immunity and 
Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini Case' (2005) 16(1) European Journal of International 
Law 89;Andrea Gattini. 'War Crimes and State Immunity in the "Ferrini" Decision' (2005) 3(1) Journal of International 
Criminal ]ustice 224-242.  
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balancing exercise of the specific circumstances of each case to be conducted by the national court 
before which immunity is claimed” (para. 106).5 
After the issuance of the ICJ judgment, the Italian Government and Parliament, presumably in an 
effort to reaffirm the harmony between Italy and Germany in their bilateral relations and in the 
European Union context, adopted consequential measures aimed at securing the full execution of 
the ICJ’s decision. In particular, on 14 January 2013, the Parliament passed Law No. 5/2013, on the 
accession of Italy to the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their 
Property6. Article 3 of this Law provided that when the ICJ in a judgment involving Italy as a party 
has excluded the jurisdiction of the Italian civil courts over specific acts attributed to a foreign State 
8any reference to the German-Italian dispute is all but accidental…), the domestic court seized with 
a controversy concerning those acts must acknowledge, also of its own motion, at any stage of the 
procedure and even if a previous non-final judgment had determined the opposite, that it lacks 
jurisdiction over such a case. In other words, Art. 3 made it mandatory for any court in Italy to 
terminate any dispute for damages initiated on the basis of the Ferrini precedent and to refrain from 
taking up any tort case whereby Germany was the defendant in a dispute concerning the 
perpetration of war crimes during World War II. This position was not only taken by the political 
branch. A few months after the publication of the ICJ ruling, the Italian Court of Cassation 
complied with it by partially quashing a judgment of the Rome military court of appeals that had 
convicted some German nationals responsible for the massacre of more than 350 civilians 
perpetrated in Fivizzano and Fosnovo (Tuscany) in 1944, namely with respect to the tort reparations 
imposed upon Germany as the defendant7. It may be added that a similar eagerness to conform to 
the authoritative pronouncement of the ICJ was shown also by an international body like the 
European Court of human rights. In Jones v. United Kingdom, confronted with a problem of 
balancing on one hand the right to access a (British) court to claim damages for alleged acts of 
torture that the applicant had endured in Saudi Arabia, and on the other the principle of State 
immunity from jurisdiction, the European Court fully endorsed the ICJ positions (that in its turn 
echoed the European Court’s Al-Adsani jurisprudence8), stopping short from discussing the “Italian 
exception”.9 
The tribunal of Florence, with an order of 21 January 201410, however, challenged the 
constitutionality of the provision just mentioned introduced with Law 5/2013, as well as of other 
norms that required the State to abide by the ICJ judgment, namely art. 1 of Law 17 August 1957 
No. 848, on the accession to the United Nations. The tribunal doubted of its constitutionality 
inasmuch as it introduced art. 94 of the UN Charter, providing binding force to the ICJ judgment for 
the States that were parties to a dispute before the Court. Most interestingly, the question of 
constitutionality raised by the tribunal attacked also the international customary norm on State 
immunity, introduced in the Italian legal system by the dispositive of automatic incorporation of 
                                                
5 On the ICJ judgment cf  Benedetto Conforti. 'The Judgment of the International Court of Justice on the Immunity of 
Foreign States : a Missed Opportunity' (2012) 21 The Italian Yearbook of International Law 135-142;Lorenzo Gradoni 
and Attila Tanzi. 'Immunità dello Stato e crimini internazionali tra consuetudine e bilanciamento: note critiche a 
margine della sentenza della Corte internazionale di giustizia del 3 febbraio 2012' (2012) LXVII La comunità 
internazionale 203 . 
6  Annalisa Ciampi. 'L'Italia attua la sentenza della Corte internazionale di giustizia nel caso Germania c. Italia' (2013) 
96(1) Rivista di diritto internazionale 146-149 . 
7  Judgment No. 32139 30 May 2012 (Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Pen. I) . 
8  Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC] (no. 35763/97) 2001-XI (ECHR)  
9 “198. […] it is not necessary for the Court to examine all of these developments in detail since the recent judgment of 
the International Court of Justice in Germany v. Italy – which must be considered by this Court as authoritative as 
regards the content of customary international law – clearly establishes that, by February 2012, no jus cogens exception 
to State immunity had yet crystallised” (Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom (nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06) 2014 
(ECHR) ). 
10  Fulvio Maria Palombino. 'Quali limiti alla regola sull’immunità degli Stati? La parola alla Consulta.' (2014) 97(2) 
Rivista di diritto internazionale 501-508 . 
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general international law set forth in art. 10(1) of the Constitution11. The initiative of the judge in 
Florence paved the way to the adoption by the Constitutional Court of judgment 238/2014, and to a 
spectacular reversal in the attitude insofar taken by the Italian authorities vis-à-vis the ICJ ruling. 
 
3. The Constitutional Court judgment No. 238/2014 
 
The judgment of the Constitutional Court has been extensively commented, in Italy and abroad. 
Only a synthetic and partial summary of the ruling can be provided here. The main conclusion 
reached by the Court is that the principle of absolute immunity of a foreign State from civil 
proceedings cannot be enforced in Italy whenever the Defendant State has admittedly committed 
through its agents crimes against humanity, war crimes, and serious violations of fundamental 
human rights in the territory of the forum’s State. The judges reject the possibility that any customs 
providing for such an unconditioned immunity of the State from civil proceedings before a foreign 
court may have been incorporated into the Italian legal order via art. 10(1) of the Constitution, 
eventually concluding that the alleged contrast between the constitutional provisions on individual 
rights and the international customary law norm has no grounds, because the principle of blanket 
State immunity, whatever may be its status under international law, has not, indeed, produced any 
effects in the domestic legal system. Conversely – and consistently with this central assumption – 
the Court invalidated the legislative measures that directly or indirectly appeared to be functional to 
the execution of the ICJ judgment and that had stripped the Italian courts of any civil jurisdiction 
over Germany. This is the case of the above-mentioned art. 3 of law 5/2013 – almost an ad hoc 
provision directly spurred by the ICJ decision -, and of art. 1, Law 848/1957, on the Italian 
accession to the UN, entailing among other things the recognition of the binding nature of the ICJ 
rulings in any controversy to which Italy is a party (art. 94 UN Charter). The provision of law 
848/1957 is constitutionally unsound, however, only insofar as it is the legal basis to make the 2012 
ICJ decision enforceable in Italy.  
The Italian Constitutional Court found that the interpretation provided by the ICJ of the scope of the 
State immunity principle was incompatible, in particular, with art. 24(1) of the Constitution. Art. 24 
states that “Anyone may bring cases before a court of law in order to protect their rights under civil 
and administrative law”. This provision is strictly connected to art. 2 Const., on the recognition and 
guarantee of the “inviolable rights of the person, both as an individual and in the social groups 
where human personality is expressed”. Jointly, the two articles are seen by the Court, in the light 
of the peculiarity of the case, as embodying the supreme value of human dignity. According to the 
Constitutional Court, “Immunity from jurisdiction of other States can be considered tenable from a 
legal standpoint, and even more so from a logical standpoint, and thus can justify on the 
constitutional plane the sacrifice of the principle of judicial protection of inviolable rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution, only when it is connected – substantially and not just formally – to 
the sovereign functions of the foreign State, i.e. with the exercise of its governmental powers […] 
Respect for fundamental principles and inviolable human rights, identifying elements of the 
constitutional order, is the limit that indicates (also with a view to achieving the goal of maintaining 
good international relations […]) the receptiveness of the Italian legal order to the international and 
supranational order […] The immunity of the foreign State from the jurisdiction of the Italian judge 
granted by Articles 2 and 24 Constitution protects the [sovereign] function [of State]. It does not 
protect behaviours that do not represent the typical exercise of governmental powers, but are 
                                                
11 Art. 10 (1): “The Italian legal system conforms to the generally recognised principles of international law”. The 
peculiarity of a judgment of constitutionality focusing on a non-written norm (an international law custom) endowed 
with supra-legislative legal force is stressed in  Antonio Ruggeri. 'La corte aziona l’arma dei “controlimiti” e, 
facendo un uso alquanto singolare delle categorie processuali, sbarra le porte all’ingresso in ambito interno 
di norma internazionale consuetudinaria (a margine di corte cost. n. 238 del 2014)' (2015) (1) Consulta 
OnLine 15 Jan. 2016 <http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/file_rivista/25522_2014_238.pdf> 
accessed 1/30/2016 . 
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explicitly considered and qualified unlawful since they are in breach of inviolable rights […]. 
Therefore, in an institutional context characterized by the centrality of human rights, emphasized by 
the receptiveness of the constitutional order to external sources […], the denial of judicial 
protection of fundamental rights of the victims of the crimes at issue (now dating back in time), 
determines the completely disproportionate sacrifice of two supreme principles of the 
Constitution.”12 
As it was the case with the judgment of the Court of Cassation mentioned above13, that promptly 
dismissed civil claims for damages against Germany on the basis of the ICJ decision, courts in Italy 
have been eager to embrace the new doctrine expressed by judgement 238/2014. Tribunals in 
Firenze and Piacenza, in particular, have pronounced judgments to the effect of asserting their 
competence to adjudicate tort claims against Germany for atrocities carried out in Italy by the 
German armed forces during World War II, and have also indicated the sums that the German 
government has to correspond to the claimants still alive or to their heirs.14 The amount awarded to 
the two plaintiffs in the Firenze trials was of 30,000 and 50,000 euros respectively. In one case, the 
tribunal offered a friendly settlement consisting of a paid internship in Germany to the benefit of a 
young member of the claimant’s family, for an equivalent of 15,000 euros, but the German 
government remained silent, and so did the Italian one.  
The issuance of these decisions (not final yet) materialise a wrongful act under international law 
that can be attributed to Italy, and that may call for some further initiative at the international stage, 
including a recourse by Germany to the Security Council, based on the failure of Italy “to perform 
the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court”, to the effect that the 
Security Council “may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to 
be taken to give effect to the judgment”.15 
From the viewpoint of the Italian plaintiffs, the prospects of having their reparation claims 
eventually enforced are uncertain, to say the least. Not only because of the adamant position of 
Germany, that has carefully avoided any involvement in the Italian trials where its liability has been 
challenged,16 but also in the light of the recent accession of Italy to the UN Convention on State 
immunity.17 The provision of article 21 of the UN Convention (on the properties of a State that are 
intended for exclusive government non-commercial purposes, and that include bank accounts in the 
use of diplomatic missions or consular posts) has been operationalized into art. 19-bis of Law 19 
November 2014, n. 162, making it extremely hard nowadays to implement post-judgment measures 
of execution against German properties located in Italy.18 Even the mentioned trial judgments that 
condemn Germany to pay damages are silent about the enforcement of such measures. 
                                                
12 Supra, note 2, para. 3.4 of the conclusions in point of law. 
13 Supra, note 5. 
14  Simoncioni c. Germania e Italia, Judgment No. 2469/2015 (N.R.G. 8879/2011) 6 July 2015 (Tribunale di Firenze, 
Sez. I);Bergamini c. Germania e Italia, No. 2468/2015 (N.R.G. 14049/2011) 6 July 2015 (Tribunale di Firenze, Sez. 
I);Judgment n. 722/2015 (N.R.G. 1931/2011) 28 September 2015 (Tribunale di Piacenza, Sez. civ.) . 
15 Charter of the United Nations.San Francisco, 26 June 1945. (Entry into force: 24 October 1945, in accordance with 
article 110. Registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations: ex officio, 26 June 1945.), art. 94(2). 
16 A short “reminder” was however sent to the tribunal of Florence after the first hearing following the trial’s 
resumption, whereby the Federal Republic of Germany maintained that the pending trial was a violation of the 
international law principles as established by the ICJ, and that thereafter it ceased to participate in the judicial 
procedure. See supra, n. 14, cases Bergamini and Simoncioni.  
17 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property New York, 2 December 2004 
(Adopted during the 65th plenary meeting of the General Assembly by resolution A/59/38 of 2 December 2004. Not yet 
in force.). It has been pointed out, generally in support of the ICJ conclusions in the International Immunity case, that 
the 2004 Convention does not provide for any exception to the immunity of States from foreign jurisdiction based on 
the ius cogens nature of the obligations they have infringed. The issue however was an object of debate during the 
preparatory works and is the object of interpretative declarations submitted by some States Parties. 
18  Federica Persano. 'Il rapporto fra immunità statale e tutela dei diritti fondamentali dell'individuo nella sentenza N. 
238/2014 della Corte Costituzionale italiana' (2015) (3) Responsabilità Civile e Previdenza 813 . 
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Further developments spurred by the Constitutional Court jurisprudence include some rulings of the 
Court of Cassation. The Penal Branch of the Italian Supreme Court found that the Republic of 
Serbia has to pay damages, jointly with the convicted individuals, to the civil parties in a criminal 
procedure against former officers of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The militaries, 
on January 7 1992, ordered to shoot down a helicopter of the European observation mission 
operating on the border between today’s Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, resulting in the 
killing of three Italian observers and one French colleague. According to the Court, and in the light 
of the 2014 Constitutional Court jurisprudence, the principle of State immunity has no effect in 
Italy “in connection with a State conduct that is prejudicial to the fundamental rights of the person 
and likely to materialize international crimes, as established by the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court”, namely war crimes. 19 
Italy however is not likely to try any civil suit against a State arising out of international crimes. In 
particular, an Italian court cannot enforce judgments issued by American courts on the basis of the 
provision of the American Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
1605A) that removes the immunity of designated foreign states sponsors of terrorism. The Joint 
Sections of the Civil Branch of Cassation Court rejected the exequatur of two judgments (including 
in the Flatow case) issued by the District Court for the District of Columbia establishing that some 
terrorist attacks perpetrated in Israel and in the Gaza Strip that killed American citizens had been 
ordered by Iran, a State designated as sponsor of international terrorism, thus granting the plaintiffs 
money damages. The Court of Cassation acknowledged that terrorist attacks may constitute crimes 
against humanity, but it rejected the exequatur, because the jurisdiction of the American court was 
based on a link (the plaintiff’s forum) that is not admissible under the Italian system.20  
 
4. Criticisms 
 
The 238/2014 judgment has been criticised under many aspects.21 From an international law 
perspective, the harsher criticism comes from those who consider the decision a case of 
unilateralism prevailing over universalism. As Anne Peters put it, the Italian Court pronouncement 
“gives priority to one (state’s) national outlook about what constitutes a proper legal order over the 
universal standard pronounced by the international court”22. More strongly, it was maintained 
“contrary to the previous Ferrini judgment, the present judgment only claims judicial authority 
within the Italian legal order. This contradiction, coupled with the superficial appearance of self-
restraint vis-à-vis international law and the ICJ, not only undermines the coherence and credibility 
of the Constitutional Court, but also deprives it from actively participating in genuine international 
legal discourse. In other words, the Constitutional Court attempted to insulate the Italian legal 
system, and therefore, itself, from international obligations, in contradiction to efforts of the 
executive and legislative authorities. The Court cannot, at the same time, attempt to shape the 
international legal debate on state immunity. As a result, the attitude of the Constitutional Court can 
hardly be deemed constructive for international law.”23 And even tougher remarks (and sometimes 
out of place) were advanced by an Author decrying that with judgment 238/2014 “the separation of 
the legal orders is pushed to its paroxysm”, and that the Court “condemns Italy to become unable 
                                                
19  Judgment No. 43696 2015 September 14 (Corte di Cassazione, Penal Branch, section I)  
20  Judgment No. 21946 2015 October 28 (Corte di Cassazione, Civil Branch, Joint Sections) ;Judgment No. 21947 2015 
October 28 (Corte di Cassazione, Civil Branch, Joint Sections) . 
21 For an introduction to the background of the case, in a forward-looking perspective, cf.  Francesco Francioni. 'Access 
to Justice and Its Pitfalls' (2016) Journal of International Criminal Justice . 
22  Anne Peters, Let Not Triepel Triumph – How To Make the Best Out of Sentenza No. 238 of the Italian 
Constitutional Court for a Global Legal Order (22 December 2014) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/let-not-triepel-
triumph-how-to-make-the-best-out-of-sentenza-no-238-of-the-italian-constitutional-court-for-a-global-legal-
order-part-i/> accessed 1/30/2016 . 
23  Raffaela Kunz. 'The Italian Constitutional Court and ‘Constructive Contestation’' (2016) (1) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice . 
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sine die and possibly seacula seaculorum [sic] to implement the ICJ judgment”, committing “what 
may then be termed a sort of judicial putsch”.24 
It has been remarked that, although based on strong axiological and logical premises, the decision 
of the Italian court failed to analyse with the necessary latitude the competing international law 
opinions and practices on sovereign immunity and ius cogens, as the ICJ did (coming to 
conclusions that are still open to criticism though)25. The Constitutional Court’s decision is 
ultimately a late and merely symbolic recognition of the human rights of the victims of Nazi 
atrocities. Despite its ambition to promote a shift in the international opinio iuris, and possibly 
induce a revirement in the ICJ jurisprudence, it is very unlikely that such objectives will ever be 
achieved.26 On the one hand, the aggrieved individuals so far received only cosmetic justice; on the 
other, the prospect of promoting at the international level a different balancing between the State 
immunity rule and ius cogens principles has been weakened by the overall ambiguity of the 
positions so far expressed by the Italian authorities27. In the meantime, before a new rule closer to 
the Italian interpretation crystallise on the international stage, it is argued that judgment 238/2014 
has the potential to disrupt the trust assigned by States to the ICJ as the interpreter of international 
law and the guardian of the international legal order. And also, the credibility of the UN is 
potentially shattered, as for the first time a norm of the UN Charter, art. 94(1) on the binding force 
of ICJ decisions, is deemed to be “unconstitutional”.28  
Unlike the Court of Justice of the EU in the Kadi case29, the Italian Constitutional Court has not 
attacked a measure adopted by a political body for not taking in due consideration the human rights 
implications of a certain course of action, namely the right to a judicial revision of a measure 
affecting individual rights, but has mandated the domestic courts not to implement a judgment 
issued by a judicial body, the ICJ, at the end of a contentious procedure in which Italy fully 
participated. All in all, with this decision, Italy seems to have started a “mini-war” against the 
pillars of the international legal order, with little chance of winning any prizes.30 
                                                
24  Robert Kolb. 'The relationship between the international and the municipal legal order: reflections on the decision no 
238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court' (2014) II QIL-Questions of International Law 5-16 . 
25  Pasquale De Sena. 'The judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court on State immunity in cases of serious violations 
of human rights or humanitarian law: a tentative analysis under international law' ibid17-31;Paolo Palchetti. 'judgment 
238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court: In search of a way out' ibid44-47;Paolo Palchetti. 'Can State Action on 
Behalf of Victims be an Alternative to Individual Access to Justice in Case of Grave Breaches of Human Rights?' 
(2015) 24(1) The Italian Yearbook of International Law Online 53-60 . 
26  Attila Tanzi. 'Un difficile dialogo tra Corte Internazionale di Giustizia e Corte Costituzionale' (2015) (1) La 
Comunità Internazionale 13-36 . 
27  Pasquale De Sena, 'The judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court on State immunity in cases of serious 
violations of human rights or humanitarian law: a tentative analysis under international law' in QIL QDI 
Volume II (http://www.qil-qdi.org/judgment-italian-constitutional-court-state-immunity-cases-serious-
violations-human-rights-humanitarian-law-tentative-analysis-international-law/ edn 2014) 17-31 The Author 
points out however that “the Constitutional Court (as the ‘guardian of the Constitution’) has the last word within the 
Italian legal system; its stance can be therefore legitimately deemed to be the current, official Italian position 
concerning the legal regime of state immunity in cases of serious violations of human rights or humanitarian law” (p. 
27). 
28  Enzo Cannizzaro. 'Jurisdictional immunities and judicial protection: The decision of the Italian Constitutional Court 
No. 238 of 2014' (2015) 98(1) Riv Dir Intern 126 : “Castled in its own legal order, the Constitutional Court has 
fashioned a decision that, in spite of its impeccable dualist logic, will hardly serve its objectives but can seriously 
imperil the authority of international law and the Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit of the Italian Constitution.” (p. 133). 
29  European Court Reports 2008 I-06351 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of 
the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.<br /> (Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P.) 
3 September 2008 (Court of Justice of the EU (Grand Chamber)) (Kadi) . 
30 “With this C[onstitutional C[ourt]’s decision, and limitedly to this particular case and its proximate consequences, 
Italy is – literally – on its own against all” (FIlippo Fontanelli, ‘I Know It’s Wrong but I Just Can’t Do Right. 
First Impressions on Judgment no 238 of 2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’ (2014)  (28 October 2014) 
<Diritti comparati <www.diritticomparati.it/2014/10/i-know-its-wrong-but-i-just-cant-do-right-first-
impressions-on-judgment-no-238-of-2014-of-the-italian-constitutional.html>> accessed 30/1/2016 ). 
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From a municipal law perspective,31 the judgment has been received with some perplexity because 
of the atypical course of reasoning adopted by the Court. The judges did not openly affirm the 
contrast between the international law norm on State immunity for iure imperii acts, as enunciated 
by the ICJ, and the principle of human dignity protected by the Constitution. They rather declared 
the non-existence, within the Italian legal order, of the disputed customary norm of absolute State 
immunity. The rule on State immunity, as enunciated by the ICJ in Germany v. Italy, has no effects 
in the domestic sphere because it does not stand the review of constitutionality conducted on the 
basis of the counter-limits to the reception of international customary law represented by the 
“fundamental principles of the constitutional order and inalienable human rights”, considered as 
“the qualifying fundamental elements of the constitutional order”.32  
The outcome is that – quite paradoxically – the request to declare the unconstitutionality of the 
international custom coming from the Florence tribunal was rejected. And there is now the 
possibility that virtually any Italian tribunal could feel encouraged to disregard international 
customary law provisions – incorporated into the Italian legal system through art. 10(1) Const. at 
the rank of constitutional law – as inexistent (and thus unconstitutional and ineffective), because in 
contrast with some counter-limits identified in the Constitution, that it feels compelled to involve 
the Constitutional Court in a number of potential cases.33  
 
5. “A vision of twilight”. Judgment 238/2014 as a constitutionally framed response to the ICJ 
 
It cannot be denied that the Italian Constitutional Court judgment has indeed reached a significant 
and not merely symbolic achievement: to oppose and resist the ICJ ruling of 2012. Indeed, States 
and judicial bodies – including the European Court of human rights – have been all too happy to 
adhere to the rule so neatly illustrated by the ICJ, and to safely overcome the quandary prompted by 
the Ferrini jurisprudence. The Italian Court has demonstrated instead that the case may not be 
considered entirely settled and the normative dispute pacified. 
Although the allegedly strict dualistic stance adopted by the Constitutional Court has grasped so 
much attention, as demonstrated by the short survey of legal literature provided in the previous 
paragraphs, maybe the most significant argument elaborated in judgment 238/2014, the gist that 
moulded the rest of its arguments and marked its contrast with the ICJ, rather lies on the way the 
Italian Court resolves the dichotomy between substantial (primary) and procedural (secondary) 
norms.34 This duality is probably much more powerful and pervasive than the opposition between 
                                                
31 Cf in general  Francesco Salerno. 'Giustizia costituzionale versus giustizia internazionale nell’applicazione del diritto 
internazionale generalmente riconosciuto' (2015) XXXV(1) Quaderni Costituzionali 33-58 . 
32 Judgment 238/2014, supra, n. 2. para. 3.2 of the conclusions in point of law. On the use of the doctrine of counter-
limits, cf. Ruggeri, cit. supra, n. 9, and  Deborah Russo. 'La sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 238 del 2014: 
la Consulta attiva i "controlimiti" all'ingresso delle norme internazionali lesive del diritto alla tutela 
giurisdizionale' <http://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/archivio-rubriche-2014/fonti-dellunione-europea-e-
internazionali/1124-la-sentenza-della-corte-costituzionale-n-238-del-2014-la-consulta-attiva-i-
qcontrolimitiq-allingresso-delle-norme-internazionali-lesive-del-diritto-alla-tutela-giurisdizionale> accessed 
1/30/2016 . 
33  Lorenzo Gradoni, Giudizi costituzionali del quinto tipo. Ancora sulla storica sentenza della Corte 
costituzionale italiana (Blog entry 10 November 2014) <http://www.sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/?p=1135> accessed 
1/30/2016;Pasquale De Sena, Spunti di riflessione sulla sentenza 238/2014 della Corte costituzionale (30 
October 2014) <http://www.sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/?p=1108> accessed 1/30/2016;Pasquale De Sena, 'The 
judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court on State immunity in cases of serious violations of human rights 
or humanitarian law: a tentative analysis under international law' in QIL QDI Volume II (http://www.qil-
qdi.org/judgment-italian-constitutional-court-state-immunity-cases-serious-violations-human-rights-
humanitarian-law-tentative-analysis-international-law/ edn 2014) 17-31 . 
34 In  Jean D'Aspremont, Epistemic Forces in International Law. Foundational Doctrines and Techniques of 
International Law Argumentation (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK 2015)  the Author identifies two 
entangled interpretative processes in international law: content-determination and law-ascertainment, roughly 
correspondig to determining primary and secondary (rules of recognition) norms. 
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dualism and monism, von Triepel and Kelsen. The ICJ has famously stated that the State immunity 
rule does not give way to the individual’s right to claim compensations before foreign domestic 
tribunals, in spite of the fact that the State has infringed ius cogens norms. The reason is that even 
ius cogens provisions (e.g. those concerning international crimes) cannot “trump” the immunity 
rule, for the simple fact that they belong to different and “parallel” sets of international law norms.35 
According to the ICJ “The application of rules of State immunity to determine whether or not the 
Italian courts have jurisdiction to hear claims arising out of those violations cannot involve any 
conflict with the rules which were violated. Nor is the argument strengthened by focusing on the 
duty of the wrongdoing State to make reparation, rather than upon the original wrongful act. The 
duty to make reparation is a rule which exists independently of those rules which concern the means 
by which it is to be effected.”36 On this basis, the ICJ dismissed any relevance of the ius cogens 
argument, an argument that indeed might have produced a rift in the normative framework that the 
ICJ chose to endorse.  
The ICJ chose to embrace a rather formalistic stance, sweeping the potentially disruptive clash 
between pro-State and pro-individuals positions under the carpet of legal technicalities.37 
Procedural norms are seen – ça va sans dire – as neutral and “rational”, like the “operating system” 
of a computer machine38 that supports the various applications but is not supposed to be affected by 
them. Also the ICJ decision, therefore, could claim to be an expression of super partes neutrality 
and rationality. 
It is exactly this impermeability between procedural and substantial rules – namely State immunity 
and the individual right to seek redress in a court of law – that the Italian Constitutional Court has 
challenged. An objection formulated by the Government’s advocate and echoing the ICJ argument 
was from the outset rejected by the Court. The State’s Avvocatura claimed that the case before the 
Constitutional Court was inadmissible because the question of constitutionality was raised in a trial 
that should have been terminated as a consequence of the ICJ decision. And indeed, “the referring 
judge raised the […] question of constitutionality of the norms that required the Tribunal to deny its 
jurisdiction”. By taking up the case, the Constitutional Court would, therefore, incur in an 
“unacceptable reversal of the relationship of logical priority between distinct procedural and 
substantial judicial assessments”. There can be no conflict between the procedural rules (defending 
the State) and the substantial norms (protecting the individuals), if no procedure exists where the 
dispute can be litigated. The Court dismissed this argument in two lines: “This objection is not well-
founded […], simply because an objection concerning jurisdiction necessarily requires an 
examination of the arguments put forward in the claim, as formulated by the parties”.39  
The rest of the judgment is largely about a balancing between the international law norm (whose 
existence and scope was certified by the ICJ) on State immunity from jurisdiction and the 
(potentially) conflicting principle of securing human rights and fundamental freedoms. This latter 
requires that the recognition of individual rights is accompanied by provisions making them 
available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable40, and that mechanisms for appeals and redress are 
                                                
35 Jurisdictional Immunity, cit supra, n. 1, para. 93. 
36  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)<br /> Volume I.C.J. Reports 
(Judgment edn International Court of Justice, 2012) p. 99 , para. 94. This part of the ICJ decision has been harshly 
criticised in  Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi. 'Il rapporto fra norme di ius cogens e la regola sull’immunità degli Stati: 
alcune osservazioni critiche sulla sentenza della Corte internazionale di giustizia del 3 febbraio 2012' (2012) (2) Diritti 
umani e diritto internazionale 310-326 . 
37 Even worse: the State “shielded” from tort responsibility was the successor of the Third Reich, and the individuals 
denied access to redress were a few surviving victims of egregious atrocities who have never received proper relief 
neither from Germany nor from Italy.  
38 The analogy is presented in  Paul F. Diehl and Charlotte Ku, The Dynamics of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2010) . 
39 Judgment 238/2014, supra n. 1, para. 2.2 of the conclusions in point of law. 
40 On human rights indicators of effectiveness and the 4A-scheme:  Jonas Grimheden, 'Indicators for Monitoring 
Human Rights' in Gudmundur Alfredsson and others (ed), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays 
in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston 2009) 421-428 . 
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also effective, i.e. available, accessible, etc. Primary and secondary rules, therefore, conflate to 
materialise a normative principle of human rights effectiveness.41 
Access to adjudication mechanisms (Art. 24 Const.) is thus necessarily associated – the Italian 
Court argues – to “substantial” fundamental rights, such as those referred to in art. 2 Const. Insofar 
as the latter are inviolable and non-derogable, thus pertaining to the “dignity” of the person, so 
ought to be the associated right to an appropriate judicial guarantee. In other words, primary norms 
need complementary secondary rules to be effective; if a special ranking is attributed to those 
primary norms, the same has to be granted to the procedural rules that make them justiciable. It is 
therefore perfectly appropriate to balance the rule on State immunity with the rule on the human 
right to access a court in case of egregious violations of human rights, namely of violations of 
international customs protecting human rights as a matter of ius cogens obligation. The “different 
sets of rules” are not so reciprocally impervious, at the end f the day.  
This approach is not peculiar to the Italian Court, of course. General Comment 29 of the Human 
Rights Committee maintains that “It is inherent in the protection of rights explicitly recognized as 
non-derogable in article 4, paragraph 2 [of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights],42 that they must be secured by procedural guarantees, including, often, judicial guarantees. 
The provisions of the Covenant relating to procedural safeguards may never be made subject to 
measures that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights.”43 A right to judicial 
appeals is explicitly mentioned among the non-derogable rights in the American Convention on 
Human Rights.44 The European Court of Human Rights, despite a consistent (but never unanimous) 
jurisprudence endorsing State immunity, has over the years increasingly emphasised the principles 
of access to a court and effective remedies and accordingly expanded the scope of articles 6 and 13 
of the European Convention on human rights, and so have done domestic Courts in several States.45  
In balancing procedural (the State immunity from foreign jurisdiction) and substantial (human 
rights) norms, via the consideration of the human (procedural) right to redress, the Constitutional 
Court performed exactly that task the ICJ had declined to undertake. The judgment of the 
Constitutional Court addresses the conflict – a dilemma indeed – between international law 
principles and rules shielding State sovereignty on one hand, and the principles and rules 
safeguarding and promoting human dignity on the other.46 The former ones are deeply embedded in 
the “operating system” of International law; the latter figure prominently in many international law 
                                                
41 ‘With an eye to the effectiveness of judicial protection of fundamental rights, the Court also noted that “the 
recognition of rights goes hand in hand with the recognition of the power to invoke them before a judge in judicial 
proceedings”. Therefore, “the recourse to a legal remedy in defense of one’s right is a right in itself, protected by 
Articles 24 and 113 of the Constitution. [This right is] inviolable in character and distinctive of a democratic State based 
on the rule of law.” (Judgment 238/2014, supra, n. 1, para. 3.4 of the conclusions in point of law). 
42 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16 December 1966 Multilateral Treaty UNTS 999, p. 
171 (Entry into force: 23 March 1976). 
43 General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (article 4) Human Rights Committee (31 August 2001) 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 , para. 15. 
44  American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San José" San José de Costarica, 22 November 1969 Multilateral 
Treaty, Organisation of American States OAS Treaty Series No. 36 (Entry into force: 18 July 1978) , Art. 27(2), with 
reference to Art. 25(1). 
45  Francesco Francioni (ed), Access to justice as a human right (Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 
2007);Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi. 'Responsabilité de l'état pour violation des obligations positives relatives aux droits 
de l'homme' (2008) Volume 333 (2008) Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Hague 175-
506;Antonio Cançado Trindade, Evolution du droit international au droit des gens — L’accès des individus à la justice 
internationale : le regard d’un juge (Pedone, Paris 2008) . Cançado Trindade has developed this point in his Dissenting 
Opinion attached to the 2012 ICJ decision:  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece 
intervening). Dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade<br /> 2012 3 February 2012 (International Court of 
Justice) . 
46 This reconstruction is convincingly articulated in  Gianluigi Palombella. 'Senza identità. Dal diritto internazionale alla 
Corte costituzionale tra consuetudine, Jus cogens e principi «supremi»' (2015) (3) Quaderni costituzionali 815-
830;Gianluigi Palombella. 'The Decision of the Italian C.C. 238/2014 on State Immunity and Access to Justice and the 
Present International Law' (2016) (forthcoming) Journal of International Criminal Justice . 
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regimes, and claim to be given priority over State sovereignty norms, namely through the normative 
dispositive of ius cogens. It is no surprise that the ICJ has thus far almost scientifically tried to 
avoid tackling such norm conflict in its case law.47  
The Italian Court proved to be less interested than the ICJ in exercising self-restraint for the sake of 
protecting State sovereignty.48 The State immunity rule could therefore be balanced against a 
competing rule aimed at providing access to justice for the victims of egregious violations of human 
rights and of international crimes. But there was a price to pay. Whereas the issue at stake was 
essentially pertaining to the realm of international law – the Italian Court’s judgment can indeed be 
approached as a kind of overdue dissenting opinion appended to the 2012 ICC award – it was 
framed as based on a yardstick provided by the domestic law: joint articles 2 and 24 of the Italian 
Constitution. It may appear as a typical municipal vs international law case, with priority accorded 
to the domestic rule – and indeed the “precedent” of the Kadi49 jurisprudence has been largely 
evocated. But the reasoning of the Constitutional Court – despite the language used – does not seem 
to be confined within the boundaries of the Italian legal system. What the Court maintains based on 
the Italian Constitution could be retold also with reference to international law standards and 
principles. The ICJ itself might have articulated its conclusions in the same way as the Italian Court 
without disposing of those Italian Constitution articles, because the existence of a human right to 
claim compensation from foreign State before a domestic jurisdiction, whose content and “ranking” 
depends on the substantial norm violated, is a plausible claim under international law as well.  
It is true that the Constitutional Court explicitly and quite emphatically bows to the authority of the 
ICJ as for the identification of the contents of the international customary rule on State immunity 
from jurisdiction. But brandishing a positive rule is not enough, from a “constitutional” perspective. 
A rule ought to be balanced with other rules and principles. The Constitutional Court provides for 
such a balancing, and concludes that the blanket immunity elicited by the ICJ cannot enter the 
Italian legal system because it contravenes the fundamental right to a judicial redress in case of ius 
cogens violations.50 This assessment is operated before the supposed international custom 
corresponding to the ICJ award entered the Italian system, or, more exactly, it is uttered at the 
threshold between the internal and international law systems,51 in a “twilight zone” where principles 
and rules of both orders overlap and dialogue with each other, especially if the concerned municipal 
order is inspired – as it is the case for the Italian Constitution – to strong receptiveness to the 
international one. In this inter-normative and inter-institutional dimension, even the conflict 
between State immunity and ius cogens can be articulated in a way that indeed challenges the 
“operative system” of international law (and of the Italian order as well), but is fully consistent with 
the mandate and the raison d’être of a judicial body that is tasked to uphold the rule of law in a 
principled and comprehensive a way.  
 
6. The role of the judiciary 
                                                
47 On the ICJ reluctance to make reference to ius cogens see  Erika De Wet, 'Ius Cogens  and Obligations  Erga Omnes' 
in Dina Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013) 
541-561 . 
48 One may contend that it is all too easy to be liberal in setting aside the sovereignty claims of… a foreign State. 
Indeed, the decision of the Italian Court can fire back to Italy as well. 
49 cf supra, n. 27. 
50 “In the present case, the customary international norm of immunity of foreign States, defined in its scope by the ICJ, 
entails the absolute sacrifice of the right to judicial protection, insofar as it denies the jurisdiction of [domestic] courts to 
adjudicate the action for damages put forward by victims of crimes against humanity and gross violations of 
fundamental human rights. This has been acknowledged by the ICJ itself, which referred the solution to this issue, on 
the international plane, to the opening of new negotiations, diplomatic means being considered the only appropriate 
method (para. 102, Judgment of 3 February 2012). Moreover, in the constitutional order, a prevailing public interest that 
may justify the sacrifice of the right to judicial protection of fundamental rights (Articles 2 and 24 Constitution), 
impaired as they were by serious crimes, cannot be identified.” (Judgment 238/2014, supra n. 2, para 3.4 of the 
conclusions in point of law). 
51 Cf Palombella, ‘The Decision…’, supra, n. 43. 
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A shortcoming of the position taken by the Constitutional Court as reconstructed in the previous 
paragraph may be that its balancing was undertaken in a purely normative dimension. The Court 
was aware of the practical concerns stemming from its decision to set aside the State immunity rule, 
but eventually, it has taken into account only strictly normative parameters. The principle of redress 
for serious violations of human rights and crimes against humanity takes priority over the State 
immunity rule because, arguing the other way round would lead to a disproportionate compression 
of the victims’ rights vis-à-vis a clear case of violation of ius cogens obligations.52 The Court seems 
to disregard the impact the judgment can have in the political-diplomatic sphere, the unease that its 
decision can cause with regard to the international partners of Italy, including the UN, considering 
the likelihood that the commission of an international wrongful act ensued from its decision – as 
indeed actually happened. The judgment is also not very clear about the consequences that domestic 
courts should draw, for example as to whether the prohibition of executing the ICJ judgment should 
result in a mere affirmation of the liability of Germany, or also into the adoption of measures of 
enforcement against the properties of the German States,53 as well as concerning the centralised or 
diffused mechanism of assessing the existence in the Italian legal system of a rule of general 
international law potentially in contrast with the Constitution.54 
Also, from this perspective, the judgment of the Constitutional Court mirrors the decision of the 
ICJ. The Hague Court set aside the argument about ius cogens obligations using a formalistic 
reasoning to avoid an intractable issue, and, aware that, in so doing it removed the last opportunity 
for the former Italian military internees to claim for redress, it expressed the wish that the 
negotiations between the two states could be reopened. Specularly - as in sort of contrappasso – the 
Court in Rome dismissed the formalistic distinction between primary and secondary rules and found 
in the core values of the Constitution – largely corresponding to the class of ius cogens obligations 
– the counter-limits to oppose to the enforcement of the State immunity rule in Italy in the specific 
domain object of the litigation. As for the practical and political implications of the decision and the 
concerns for international comity that commonly arise in the reasoning of the Constitutional Court 
as legitimate elements that ought to be given an appropriate weight in a proportionality test of 
constitutionality, they appear to have been utterly neglected.55  
Was the Constitutional Court too rigorous in expunging from its purview practical considerations 
and in rejecting to assume a more pragmatic attitude that could have appeased the ICJ (and the 
UN)? Could it have managed to break the deadlock by, for example, upholding the ICJ conclusions 
and mandate the State authorities to take up the invitation to resume negotiations with Germany, or 
to pass ad hoc legislation providing adequate allowances for the persons concerned? On this point, 
support for the principled and clear-cut position adopted by the Constitutional Court comes from a 
passage in Prof. Perrakis’ plaidoirie before the ICJ on September 14, 2013. In his passionate speech 
are clearly identified the intrinsic limits of a political-diplomatic approach to the matter of 
individuals’ redress in case of international crimes. Frankly speaking, experience shows that States 
– any States – in these matters are not trustworthy unless they are assisted and overseen by the firm 
guidance of the judiciary. 
 
Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, ça relève de l’hypocrisie absolue de prétendre aujourd’hui 
que la question des réparations devrait être engagée au niveau interétatique. Comment exploiter une procédure 
diplomatique si les Etats ne veulent pas influencer leurs bonnes relations ? […] En fait, combien de traités de paix ont 
été signés après de récents conflits (Iraq, Liban, Géorgie ⎯ que sais-je) ? De quels traités de paix parle-t-on quand les 
                                                
52 Cf supra, n. 11 and accompanying text. 
53 Cf supra, n. 18 and accompanying text. 
54 Cf supra, n. 31 and accompanying text. 
55 From this perspective it might be said that the Italian Court adopted a “civilist approach”, rather than a fully 
“constitutional” one, according to the taxonomy proposed in  Robert Uepermann-Wittzak, 'Serious Human Rights 
Violations as Potential Exceptions to Immunity: Conceptual Challenges' in Anne Peters and others (ed), Immunities in 
the Age of Global Constitutionalism (Brill, Leiden 2014) 236-243 . 
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conflits modernes, la plupart de temps, ne sont ni déclarés, ni terminés formellement ? Pourquoi les signataires du traité 
de Moscou n’ont pas abordé la question des réparations dans cet instrument ? Pourquoi, dans le passé, il y avait des 
réponses «choisies» et «partielles» face aux revendications des victimes ? Que veut-on dire par combien de temps faut-
il attendre pour que la question soit résolue ? Certainement jusqu’au moment où les Etats responsables assument 
pleinement leur responsabilité. Qui doit honorer l’engagement pris depuis plus d’un siècle : «celui qui viole le droit 
international doit réparer» ? Et si les Etats ayant pris cet engagement n’agissent pas au niveau national ou international, 
comment réagir ? Que faire ? Comment qualifier donc cette situation présente au niveau international en essayant 
d’apporter des réponses convaincantes à des victimes comme celles de Distomo ? Comment nier tout effet juridique 
émanant de l’article 3 [of Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Hague, 18 October 
1907]  quant à un droit aux réparations pour violations graves du droit international humanitaire ? Une logique juridique 
restrictive pour combien de temps peut-elle résister encore quand la communauté internationale, aujourd’hui même, 
renvoie devant les assisses de la Cour pénale internationale des chefs d’Etat comme Bashir du Soudan et Kadhafi de 
Libye pour crimes contre l’humanité, et prend des mesures en faveur des droits de l’homme, des populations 
vulnérables, des victimes de guerre ? 56 
 
7. Conclusive remarks 
 
This short analysis has tried to demonstrate that the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court 
represents indeed a direct challenge to the ICJ ruling in the International Immunity case, but is not a 
threat for the international law order. It does not aim at widening the schism between municipal and 
international law. Should one look for a judicature asserting the irrelevance of international 
customary law, exclusive loyalty to the national constitution and disregard for international courts’ 
decision, the Italian courts are definitely not the most obvious example.57  
Judgment 238/2014 is rather evidence that at least some national courts are increasingly inclined 
towards a more intense involvement in the international normative arena. They bring into the 
international law discourse their own style of reasoning and arguing, where the rule of law principle 
is paramount, whereas some original characters of international law, including sovereign equality of 
States, fit rather problematically. The realm of international law has grown complex and 
confrontational. An extra quantum of wisdom, integrity and open-mindedness is required to balance 
freedom and justice and make them progress. 
 
  
                                                
56  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening). Public sitting held on Wednesday 14 
September 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding. Verbatim Record 2011 14 September 
2011 (International Court of Justice) (Stelios Perrakis) . 
57 Looking around, one could for example bump into this paragraph: “Even in activities where there are spillovers, such 
as law on the use of force, American law is probably better than international law. The United States is the world’s 
great power, sometimes called the global hegemon in international relations theory. It stands to gain the lion’s share of 
resources from the peace and prosperity of the world. Its political process has incentives to provide laws that contribute 
to peace and prosperity, such as appropriate use of force. Moreover, as a hegemon composed of immigrants who remain 
concerned about the welfare of their former nations, America affords citizens from all over the world some virtual 
representation in its political process. These guarantees of beneficence for foreigners are surely imperfect, but they 
seem better than those provided by customary international law. Thus, by insisting that United States courts follow 
American law and not raw international law, Americans serve both themselves and others around the globe. America 
helps the world most by remaining true to her own democratic genius.” (John O. McGinnis. 'The Comparative 
Disadvantage of Customary International Law' 30(1) Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 7-14 , 30). 
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